"[P]ara Que Me Saque Cabesea por Cabesa…": Exchanging Muslim and Christian Slaves across the Western Mediterranean[1]

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In the winter of 1613, the Algerian corsair Babaçain left the port of Algiers captaining a *saetia*, one of the ships with Latin sails used by North African corsairs, and headed north to the Spanish coast in the hope of capturing Christians to sell back at home. At the time, Babaçain was seventy years old and probably already had plans to retire. This could have been his last embarkation. Sadly, two leagues, around five miles, away from Cartagena, the Algerian ships ran into a Spanish royal squadron. After a brief battle, the Algerians had to acknowledge defeat. Babaçain was taken captive by the captain of the *Patrona Real*, the galley leading the squadron. He and his crewmembers were interrogated, enslaved, and put to work as oarsmen in the royal fleet. Two years earlier, in 1611, Sergeant Domingo Álvarez, a Spaniard serving Phillip III, was posted with his company, a body of close to 150 soldiers, in Oran, the largest Spanish fort-city in North Africa. Unfortunately, *en route*, his ship ran into Algerian corsairs. After a brief battle, the Spaniards had to acknowledge defeat, and Álvarez and his comrades were taken captive and enslaved as rowers on the galleys of the Algerians' corsairs, possibly of the kind that Babaçain had captained.[2]

For early modern ears, such heartbreaking stories sounded fairly common not to say trivial. After all, a few millions of Muslims and Christians were taken captive and enslaved in the early modern Mediterranean: 300,000 to 400,000 Moroccans and North African Ottoman Subjects passed through Portugal and Spain between 1450 and 1750; about 500,000 Muslims were enslaved in Italy between the beginning of the sixteenth century and the end of the eighteenth; in Malta alone, between 35,000 and 40,000 Muslims (around half of which were North Africans) were sold as slaves in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and more than a million Christians were enslaved in the Maghrib

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between 1530 and 1780.[3] It is not always possible to distinguish between Muslims from the Maghrib, Mashriq and Anatolia but the fact that these calculations exclude the Spanish Balearic and Canary Islands, Sardinia and France means that the numbers of Maghribis enslaved in southern Europe must have been even higher. In any case, the sight of laboring slaves or recently ransomed captives begging in the town square was common for Mediterranean city dwellers.

Why juxtapose the captivity tales of Babaçain and Álvarez? Indeed, they are strikingly similar: on the one hand, a corsair, i.e. a "state" authorized pirate, taken captive and employed as a slave by his Christian enemies; on the other, a soldier, captured and enslaved by Muslim enemies. But does mere similarity justify subjecting these human trajectories to the same historiographical framework? And is resemblance the only relation between these trajectories? Most scholars of piracy and captivity answer the first question in the negative.[4] The underlying scholarly assumptions are that despite their parallels, these are two distinct historical phenomena: enslavement of Muslims in the northern shores of the Mediterranean, and captivity of Christians in North Africa. Empirically, the claim is based on the fact that Algiers, Tunis, and Morocco did not develop ransom institutions similar to the French and Iberian Orders of Redemption (the Trinitarians and the Mercedarians). In the absence of such institutions, Muslim captives, as opposed to Christians, had little hope of returning home and thus should be considered slaves. On a theoretical level, the treatment of captivity of Muslims and of Christians as two separate phenomena privileges a national rather than a transnational perspective. Scholars' decision to focus on more "real" objects such as nations or states results in writing the histories of Spanish, French, Portuguese or Algerian captivity instead of a connected history of Mediterranean slavery.[5] Such perspective overshadows the interdependence and links between the two captivities and disconnects related processes, which were constantly in mutual formation.

It is time to answer the second question – is resemblance the only thing linking the captivity of Babaçain and Álvarez? The answer is no. If we keep on following what happened to them, we discover that their stories do intersect just before the moment of their ransom when they were exchanged, one for the other. Such exchanges, facilitated by the short distance separating Sicily from Tunis, Algiers from Majorca, or Gibraltar from Tangiers and Tétouan, weaved social and political links between the two captivities. They also demonstrate that the absence of

ransom institutions did not prevent North Africans from ransoming their dear ones. Maghribi rulers often discussed the ransom of their subjects as part of the negotiations of peace treaties with European powers.[6] Beyond that, at irregular intervals, Algerian pashas or Moroccan sultans initiated negotiations with their Spanish counterparts over the exchange of large numbers of captives. This happened, for example, in 1612 when Muḥammad al-Shaykh al-Ma'mūn, ruler of Fez and one of three sons of Saadian Sultan Aḥmad al-Manṣūr, negotiated with the Portuguese governor of Tangiers the return of several of his subjects for Christian captives.[7] A similar deal was cut in 1629, when Morato Āghā, an Algerian emissary, was sent to the Spanish fort town of Oran in order to, among other things, barter five Turks for Christians.[8] And again in 1634, when a local Moroccan leader whose name the sources do not reveal negotiated with the governor of Larache (El Araich) the swapping of two Muslims for seventy Christians.[9] The exchange rate was not always in favor of the Christians. When in 1689, Alaouite Sultan Mawlāy Ismā'īl ibn al-Sharīf conquered Larache, he demanded one thousand Muslims in return for the hundred Spaniards he took captive.[10] Doubtlessly, such interactions occurred more often than we now know, and somewhere in the General Archive of Simancas documents recording them still lie buried, awaiting discovery.[11]

As little as we know about these diplomatic interactions, we know a lot less about how simple folks, men but more often women, negotiated the exchange of their spouses, sons, or siblings. The efforts of common Maghribis and Iberians towards liberating their kin, thus, stand at the heart of this article. On the basis of the reconstruction and analysis of such negotiations and exchanges, I argue that North African Muslims of all classes actively pursued the release of their family despite the absence of institutionalized Maghribi ransom mechanisms. Moreover and in light of the absence of institutional ransom mechanisms, the fact that barter, or the exchange of one slave for another, was the most common ransom modality North Africans pursued demonstrates how connected and inter-dependent the captivity of Muslims and that of Christians was.

That captivity of Muslims and Christians formed interdependent elements of a single Mediterranean system, however, does not mean they were identical. Far from that, the system was asymmetrical.[12] Christians were ransomed in greater numbers. The reason was that several institutions in Christendom took care of the ransom of Christians: the Trinitarian and the Mercedarian Orders, church institutions charged with

the liberation of Christians from the Maghrib, ransomed Portuguese, Spanish and French captives, while Italian urban fraternities ransomed Italian captives.[13] The absence of similar institutions on the Muslim side meant that the system offered Christians and Muslims uneven chances of retrieving their liberty.

Asymmetry also characterized the production and archiving of records that documented trafficking and ransom of Muslims. Whereas the Orders of Redemption, from the 1570s on, systematically recorded their missions, thus establishing serial documentary corpora that contained names of ransomed captives, ransom prices and detailed descriptions of ransom negotiations, it seem as if similar documentation for the seventeenth century North Africa was either produced in smaller quantities, not archived, did not survive or still awaits discovery and study.[14] That means that for now, at least, ransom of Muslims must rely on records written by Christians and Maghribi Muslims and Jews archived in Spanish archives. There are no inventories cataloging such transactions or bundles containing them alone neatly stacked on the archive's shelves. Relevant information appears irregularly in petitions of all sorts sent to the Council of War or now and then in notarial records. These can be complemented by searching data in the margins of autobiographies, inquisitorial investigations, intelligence reports and letters. Thus, while I do not make claims about the volume of such exchange practices, I argue that there are enough of them to justify their examination as a unified object of study. An analysis of the mechanics and use of these practices offers a new way of understanding captivity and how it linked North African powers and the Spanish Empire.[15]

Petitioning the Ruler

It is time to go back to Babaçain and Álvarez and their fate. In the years following his capture, Babaçain never lost hope, and kept writing letters and sending messages through a network of merchants, soldiers, and ransomed captives, both Christian and Muslim, that crisscrossed the Mediterranean. Such information had to be precise and include the address in which the slave was employed, his masters' name or the galley on which he rowed as an oarsman. In 1655 or a year earlier, for example, an unidentified Muslim slave wrote to his relatives in Algiers explaining that he was enslaved "in Sanlucar [de Barrameda in western Andalusia]…in the street of the Bretons, [and] his owner [was] called Nicolás Rubin."[16] In the case of Babaçain, the information he needed to

provide was the name of the royal galley in which he pulled the oar. Providing his wife with this detail, however, was only the first step towards retrieving his liberty. From that point on, she was the one who had to take the lead in arranging his release. The chance of royal slaves, such as Babaçain, buying their liberty was even smaller than those held in urban households. Rather than negotiating independently, such slaves usually had to find a proxy who would do it on their behalves. The surest way of finding a Christian agent who would free her husband was to force someone to do it.

Yet how might an old Algerian woman force a Spaniard to act on her behalf and safely return her husband? Purchasing a Christian captive, preferably a soldier, was her best shot. Indeed, that is exactly what Babaçain's wife did. She bought Domingo Alvarez from his owner, neither to have him as a servant in her household, nor to profit from his ransom, but to use him to get her husband back. Her selection was not arbitrary; she must have first asked around, ascertaining that he would fulfill her needs. Alvarez belonged to the massive class of poor captives who rarely had the means to ransom themselves. Given this, his price would not have been too high and, if he wanted to return home, he would have to obey her demands. But there was another reason for which she preferred him over other captives: he was a soldier with many years of service behind him. As such, he was in a better position than "civil" captives to ask favors from the king. And that is exactly what he was expected to do: write to the king and ask to be exchanged in return for her husband. Poor Alvarez was happy to cooperate. In the petition he sent the Council of War (*Consejo de Guerra*) in April 1616, he wrote that "after serving his majesty for many years in the royal navy . . . he was captured by the Turks of Algiers,"[17] thus stressing his history of service. He added, likely at the urging of Babaçain's wife, that "he has no possessions with which to ransom himself, and the said moor, his mistress, was determined that no sum could convince her to give him his freedom other than her own husband's liberty."[18]

The crown was reluctant to accept this kind of deal, and the archive of the Council of War preserves many orders the king issued to the royal fleet throughout the seventeenth century, prohibiting the concession of galley slaves to individuals.[19] Rarely, did the king approve more than a handful of petitions. In 1630 it approved twenty-five such petitions and a similar, if not larger, number of petitions must have been approved in the preceding couple of years. These were exceptional years, however, that

followed a successful Moroccan attack on the Spanish fort town of La Mamora (Mehedía), in which a large number of soldiers were taken captive.[20] The crown resisted such exchanges for three reasons. First, the royal fleet had a constant shortage of slaves; second, Spanish bureaucrats feared that Muslim ship captains would revert to their earlier practice of preying on Spanish ships and coasts and capturing Spaniards; third, although the crown usually prohibited handing over enslaved Muslim corsairs to Christians petitioners hoping to save their dear ones, it was occasionally involved in and even initiated such exchanges when the captives were influential powerful nobles, officers or a large group of soldiers. The somewhat confusing classification system of Muslim slaves developed by the bureaucrats of the Spanish fleet reflects these reasons. The fleet officers distinguished between "corsairs" or "captains of Arab ships" (*arraezes*), on the one hand, and "Moors of ransom" (*moros de rescate*) or "Moors of value" (*moros de consideración*), on the other. While the crown did not grant petitioners slaves classified as "corsairs" fearing they would return to attack Spanish ships, it also refused to provide petitioners with slaves classified "moors of ransom." Such slaves were of high value due to their status or wealth and thus were kept for future exchange of those the crown honored. Captives' kin, then, had a chance of obtaining the slave they wanted from the crown only if he was not a corsair nor or exceptional value. Petitioners, familiar with this system, employed the fleet's classifications when applying to the crown. For example, María de Puçeula, who hoped to exchange her husband captured in Tétouan, petitioned the crown in 1587 for the brother-in-law of her husband's master. In her petition, she wrote that the requested slave is "not an *arraez* or (a Moor) of importance."[21] Similarly, in 1616, Juan López Malvada stated in his petition that Hamete, the slave he asked for "was not an *arraez* or (a Moor) of ransom."[22]

The petitions Spaniards submitted to the crown placed in motion investigations regarding the status of the requested slave. The story of Elvira García, a widow from the city of the Puerto de Santa María near Cádiz, who negotiated with an unidentified Moroccan widow the exchange of their sons, illustrates the bureaucratic trajectories of these petitions. García's only son, Diego, enlisted as a cabin boy on a ship captured by the galleys of the Sultan of Morocco in 1593 when the eighteen-year-old youth was enslaved with the rest of the sailors. Despite her poverty, García did all she could to ransom Diego, but without success. Two years later, the Moroccan widow, whose son Amete was enslaved in

1583 on the Spanish royal galley *La Granada*, contacted García. The Moroccan wrote to her, saying, "she will ask the king (of Morocco) to give her as alms the other Christian (García's son) so [that in exchange for him] they will give her back her son."[23] García immediately addressed the king through his Council of War, recounting the sufferings of her child and the offer made to her by Amete's mother. She asked that, "in light of that the king will give her as a favor the… Moor in order to complete the exchange with her son."[24]

As in the case of Alvarez and Babaçain, the Council of War deferred to the king for instructions and was ordered to contact the *contador* of the royal galleys, the person in charge of the books listing the slaves working in the galleys, and to ascertain Amete's status. In this way, the Council would determine the Muslim slave's role on the ship on which he was held, the circumstances of his capture, and his current age. If the fleet officers decided that the slave in question was not "a Moor of ransom" and thus exchangeable, they would send their decision to the Council, which would in turn pass it on to the king. In response to García's petition, the fleet officers reported to the Council of War – "Hamete [sic] of Morocco, son of Ali, twenty two years of age, long eye lashes and thick brows, a birthmark on his throat and a burn scar on his right arm, a few cuts on his forehead and of small-size body, who was taken captive in the Almeria de Ceuta… on October 7, 1583… and as it seems in the books of our offices and we are informed he is not of value, or a corsair or of ransom."[25] In this case, then, the fleet officers gave the green light for proceeding to the next step towards exchanging the two slaves.

Problems arose when the petitioners and the *contador* or other fleet officers disagreed about a slave's status. Such disagreements resulted from incorrect or debated enlistment of Muslim slaves at the time of their capture, or when they were delivered to the fleet officers. Sometimes, captains who caught Muslims falsely claimed they were corsairs, in order to get a greater bonus. Juana de los Santos argued in her petition that the captain who caught Hamete Muxi lied when he listed him as an *arraez* – "and the captain who captured him, in order to increase his benefits, despite the fact he [the Muslim] was someone else, handed him to them [galleys' officers] as an *arraez.*"[26] When petitioners' requests were refused due to the status the crown attributed to the slave in question, they tried to trace Christian captives who had been previously held on the Muslim ship where the slave they wanted was captured. They took the

testimonies of these ex-captives, hoping to convince the fleet officers of the petition's merit. Juana de los Santos acted differently: she provided the testimony of Luis de Guerra, a Portuguese Trinitarian who was held hostage in Tétouan for many years, who swore that Hamete Muxi, the Muslim slave de los Santos requested from the crown, was "of no importance (*baxo*)." Juana de los Santos soon discovered that even such a testimony was not enough—the *adelantodo* simply refused to hand Hamete Muxi over to her. In another petition to the crown, she complained that the *adelantado* was "always looking for excuses and not feeling the sufferings of the Christian captives."[27] The *adelantado* stood in the way of others as well. Ysabel Hernández, Antón Rodriguez's wife, claimed "that even though she went to the *adelantado* with the two said writs (*cedula*), he refused to give her the said Turk whom she demanded."[28] In other words, getting royal writs ordering the fleet officers to hand over slaves to petitioners was not always sufficient evidence, and different officers along the chain of command could prevent the execution of such exchanges.

Barring objections from the fleet officers, the petitioners could advance to the next step. These deals involved a twofold exchange. When and if the crown finally agreed to concede its galley slaves, it demanded alternative ones in return. While the slaves that petitioners sought were usually old, weak, and sick—or at least that was how petitioners portrayed them in their requests—the ones that the crown demanded in their place had to be young, healthy, and strong. In other words, in order to obtain a slave to exchange for kin held captive in the Maghrib, petitioners had to provide the crown with an alternative slave. The insistence of the crown on exchanging and never giving its slaves as gifts points at another asymmetry between captivity of Muslims and Christians and sheds light on a recent debate about whether Mediterranean bondage should count as captivity or slavery. The large majority of Christians imprisoned in the Maghrib, Robert Davis has argued, lived and died as slaves and should be studied as such.[29] Michel Fontenay has advanced the debate by insisting on the distinction between "slaves" defined by their use-value and "captives" by their exchange-value; the majority of captives were purchased by business-oriented traders who bought them as a shrewd investment, whereas slaves were bought by slave owners who solely sought to benefit from the fruits of their slaves' labor. Fontenay has explained that in the Mediterranean, as opposed to the Atlantic, captives were slaves waiting for their ransom whereas

slaves were captives who gave up on the hope of being ransomed.[30] For this reason it was possible to distinguish a captive from a slave only in regard to those slaves who were ransomed and returned home. In other words, the distinction could be made only after the fact of ransom.[31] The case of Muslim slaves owned by the Spanish crown, however, demonstrates that even when such slaves faced a potential ransom – i.e. were about to become captives, they maintained their use-value. The king was willing to give up on them only for a young, healthy and strong alternative Muslim slave, treating slaves in terms of muscle mass.

The king's demand meant that before the petitioners got the slave they needed, they had to obtain another with whom they would pay the crown. This point is important, as it further complicates the distinction between captives and slaves, buyers who bought captives in order to sell them and those who bought them in order to exploit their labor. The dynamic examined here shows that at least some North Africans bought Christian slaves in order to exchange them for their dear ones enslaved in Spain; at least some Christians bought Muslim slaves in order to exchange them for another Muslim slave, by which they may obtain the release of their relatives. In their portrayal of the categories of "slave' and 'captive" as exclusive and defined by use-value in the case of the former and exchange-value in the vase of the latter, the participants in the debate over Mediterranean bondage ignored the fact that these were dimensions of a single process. Enslaved captives constantly moved between the statuses of "slave" and "captive" and captives could and did have use-value while slaves could and did have exchange-value. Labor and market profit alone do not exhaust the motives of buyers of captives in the early modern Mediterranean. Perhaps more important, these multi-layered exchanges clearly manifest some of the links between enslavement of Christians and Muslims. That Spaniards who formed parties in such ransom coalitions had to provide the crown with alternative slaves further complicates this interdependence, and points out the self-perpetuating nature of these violent practices and exchanges.

The nature of the documentation is such that we know a lot less about the parallel communications between Muslim captives or their kin and Maghribi rulers, Algerian pashas or Moroccan Sultans.[32] It is clear that in different stages there was a religious and political obligation to provide captives and their families with aid. In eighteenth century Algiers, for example, a new category of en-dowment for Muslims held captive in Christian land appeared in the waqf income registers. Apart

from that, a certain percentage of the booty captured by the corsairs was collected by the government for the same end.[33] How did captives' kin ask and receive that support, however? What if they needed a slave owned by the authorities or the Sultan? The few Spanish documents that echo such interactions suggest that rulers collaborated with their subjects by helping them upon request. This was the case for Hamete's mother, the Moroccan widow who negotiated a deal with Elvira García and who according to García intended to ask the Sultan for the captive Diego, Gacía's son. Other sources suggest that like their Spanish counterparts, Maghribi rulers often had ransom agendas opposed to their subjects' needs. One such source presents the critique Ridwān al-Janawī – the son of a Genoese convert, a healer who performed miracles, ransomed captives and was venerated as a holy man – launched in Fez against the ruler after the battle of Ksar El Kebir. The victorious Sultan, Ahmed al-Manṣūr, preferred sel-ling the thousands of Portuguese captives he took rather than giving them to his subjects who had relatives held captive in Portugal. Riḍwān al-Janawī, condemned al-Manṣūr.[34] These are no more than scant hints pointing out allegedly similar tensions between rulers and ruled across the sea. More evidence and research are required in order to further tease out such a comparison.

Ransom Dealers

Getting the necessary information, most importantly where a captive was held and what his identity was, and obtaining the slave required for the exchange was the first step in a long process. Humble family members hardly ever had the means and knowledge needed to advance the transaction to the next stage transferring a slave across the sea and exchanging him or her for another. It was at this point that Maghribis and Iberians contacted and contracted intermediaries: Jews, Christians, Muslims, Moriscos, or renegades (Christians who converted to Islam). Everyone who was able to occasionally participated in the trade, a fact echoed, as we will see, in the fragmented nature of the information extant about the intermediaries. For many of these intermediaries, the positions of trader, pirate, ransomer, or captive meant different stages in complex professional trajectories often linked with commerce. This was the case of the Spaniard Gaspar de los Reyes, who after a few years of captivity in Algiers, ransomed himself, and struck an agreement with two local Algerian families and two Christian captives. To the Algerians he promised to buy their relatives held captive in the town of the Puerto de

Santa María; to the Christians, to collect money for their ransom from their kin, also in the Puerto de Santa María. De los Reyes left Algiers to Spain, received the Muslim slaves, and got the money for the Christian captives. Then, he continued to Málaga where he received sixteen more "Turks" from Christians who bought them in order to exchange them with their beloved ones imprisoned in Algiers.[35] De los Reyes provides a typical example of a captive-turned-redeemer, literally capitalizing on the social contacts he established through his work as a slave in a tavern in Algiers, where he also came to master Arabic. That in Málaga a large number of people contracted him to transfer Muslim slaves to Algiers shows the pervasiveness of the practice. In one trip he was able to release eighteen Muslims! The large number of Muslim captives picked up in Málaga suggests that the port city served as a center for such transactions and that captives' kin knew where intermediaries like de los Reyes were to be found. And yet, the only reason for which we know of the case is that de los Reyes converted to Islam and ended up sentenced at the inquisitorial tribunal of the Canary Islands where he and other witnesses told his story. In this last regard, the case demonstrates the difficulty of studying such transactions, which in the absence of systematic recording and archiving requires the collection of data scattered at the margins of seemingly unrelated documentation.

Intermediaries of this kind often collaborated, forming partnerships that crossed confessional lines. Judas Malachi was a Jewish merchant from Tétouan and one of the suppliers of the Peñón de Vélez, a Spanish fort in Morocco. He operated as a Spanish royal ransom agent in the Maghrib between 1589 and 1595.[36] The contract Malaqui struck with the crown obliged him to send hostages to Málaga. Malaqui provided two Muslim business associates as hostages; one of them, the merchant Hamete Madan from Fez, stayed until at least 1595.[37] Like this merchant from Fez, Moriscos in Tunis, who were extremely active in the local ransom market throughout the seventeenth century, worked tightly with Jews from Livorno.[38] Some Muslims and former Muslims specialized in the ransom and rescue of Muslims from Christian lands. In 1571, a Muslim slave in Naples, who had converted to Christianity years earlier and was baptized as Aniello Tarantino, was accused by the Inquisition of blasphemy. During his trial, the inquisitors discovered that he had taken advantage of the liberty that conversion to Christianity provided him, and for a high price arranged for North African slaves to escape back to the Maghrib.[39]

For Christian merchants from Spain, ransoming Christians from the Maghrib was mainly a way of legitimating commerce with North Africa. As part of this commerce, they also ransomed or participated in the exchange of Muslims enslaved in Spain. Among the ransom intermediaries, Majorcan corsairs and merchants, who specialized in trade with North Africa, were renowned. For them, as for other Iberian subjects of the Spanish crown, the discourse of ransom, or more precisely that of the redemption of captives, was evoked in order to legitimize trade in other commodities with Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco. Spanish official discourses echoed religious rhetoric that prohibited direct trade with the infidel. However, in practice, trade with North Africa became a normal occurrence in seventeenth century Spain and the volume of direct and indirect trade between Spain and the Maghrib grew throughout the period.[40] This commerce functioned under a system of "permanent exception": the special licenses that the crown issued over and over again for merchants trading with the Maghrib turned in fact into a form of tax.[41] In order to obtain a license, traders had to prove that part of the transaction was geared towards the ransom of Christians. The system had its limits, however, as is demonstrated by the case of the Majorcan skipper Già. In 1668, on behalf of a mercantile company from his island, Già exported tar to Algiers. Unlike other commodities, tar was deemed a material of war, and its sale to Muslims was absolutely prohibited. Già was arrested by the Inquisitorial tribunal of Majorca in 1669.[42] In his defense, he claimed that he used his profits to ransom captives. Sadly, since the majority of the captives that left Algiers with him claimed they paid for their liberty with their own money, the argument did not serve him very well.[43]

We see then, the difficulty of generalizing about the intermediaries' motives. Anyone who was on the spot might and often did engage in the ransoming process. Some did so out of compassion to their coreligionists. Others rescued their friends, kin, or fellow countrymen. Profit was central for many ransomers, but it would be wrong to reduce participation in the trade to simple economic motives. Maghribi Muslims and Jews, residents of the Spanish garrisons and of Moroccan and Algerians settlements, employed the ransom of captives to facilitate the commercial contacts with Spain; Già did so to whitewash his illegal arms export; and other Christian merchants ransomed co-religionists to lubricate commerce with North Africa.

Spaces of Exchange

Bustling port cities such as Málaga, Cádiz, or the Puerto de Santa María were known as trade centers in which one could commission a merchant to transfer Muslims south to the Maghrib and to return with liberated Christians, but the actual exchange often took place in the Christian enclaves dotted throughout the North African littoral.[44] In the western part of North Africa it was mostly the Portuguese (Ceuta, Tangiers etc.) and Spanish (Bougie [Béjaïa], Oran etc.) *presidios*, in the central part French and Genoese (Bastion de France, Tabarka) trading posts. They varied in their degree of autonomy and sovereignty, in the forms of social and ethnic life they generated, and hence in the kind of transactions they enabled. The idea behind the fifteenth century Portuguese and sixteenth Spanish *presidios*, the result of the continuation of the movement of the *Reconquista* to North Africa, was to establish a network of forts that supported each other while providing control over major maritime trading routes. Ironically, they ended up reproducing elements of *convivencia* Spain.[45] The Spanish fort town of Oran, for example, held a large Jewish community, whose members provided Christians with translation and interpretation services, money loans, food provisions, strategic information and trafficking of slaves. It also included a small number of Muslims, partly but not exclusively slaves.[46] Often, the Jewish leaders of the local community were asked to employ their connections in Algiers in order to ransom Christians held captives there.[47] In some cases, Algerian envoys were sent to the city to negotiate the exchange of captives.[48]

Ceuta, a Portuguese settlement from 1415 and part of the Spanish Empire from 1580, provides another example of such a trading zone. Only twenty-two miles away from Tétouan and nineteen from Algeciras in Spain, this fort town was ideal for exchanging Spanish subjects for Maghribis. Three cases from the mid-seventeenth century illustrate Ceuta's role as a center for the ransoming of captives. In the first, the mother of "English Mostafa," an Algerian Morisco captured by Christians in the early 1640s, bought Emanuel d'Aranda and two other captives in order to exchange them for her son and four other "Turks." She hired a "Turk" to take them with a ship to Tétouan but a short distance away from the city the ship sunk and the survivors had to proceed on land to Tétouan. There, they lodged in the house of a Jewish merchant and sent letters to Ceuta announcing their arrival in Tétouan. They soon discovered that the person they were waiting for had already

left Ceuta for Gibraltar. However, before leaving he arranged credit for them in Tétouan through a local Morisco merchant.[49] This way, they did not have to wait in prison. Two Muslim merchants in Ceuta provided credit for the Turks with whom d'Aranda and his friends were to be exchanged, and the Turks also waited in freedom for the swap to take place. After further back and forth, and with the help of local merchants, the captives were exchanged and returned home.[50] In the same year, another Algerian family that hoped to ransom their kin enslaved in Spain bought Diego Hernández, a Christian captive, for that purpose. They hired one Zigamete [Sid Ahmed?], an Algerian residing in Tétouan, and ordered him to take Diego Hernández to Ceuta to meet Domingo Alvales, a Christian intermediary representing Hernández's wife, Juana Ramirez. Alvales had to hand over to Zigamete the relative of the Algerians whom he received from Juana Ramirez, and in return receive Diego Hernández.[51] A decade later, Diego López de Acosta, held captive in Algiers, was trying to engineer his exchange in return for a Muslim enslaved in Sanlúcar de Barrameda. He sent instructions to Tomas Velásquez de Oliver, asking him to buy the Muslim slave: "[S]end him to Ceuta with heavy guard, and make him write [to me and order me when] to leave [Algiers] to Tétouan in order that the exchange will be executed there *as is the custom* (emphasis added)."[52] Beyond stressing the importance of Ceuta and Tétouan as spaces of exchange, De Acosta's words demonstrate how ransom procedures followed rules and created expectations among the parties involved. These cases also shed light on the complexity of such exchanges and on the collaboration required between Christians, Muslims, Moriscos and Jews. In some instances, it was the habitants of tiny settlements neighboring the *presidio* who walked there themselves to negotiate ransom independently. Amar ben Aabica (as Spanish sources spell his name) crossed the distance from his village to near Melilla several times in 1595 in the hope of ransoming his son, who was taken captive and now pulled an oar on one of the Spanish royal galleys. Ben Aabica purchased for that purpose two soldiers from Melilla who were taken captive by the Muslim neighbors of the fort. The governor of the *presidio* tried to ransom the soldiers for money but the father refused. Eventually, the governor wrote to the Council of War and asked for Amar ben Aabica's son explaining that otherwise the father would not release the captive soldiers.[53]

Tabarka, an island near Tunis, conquered by Charles V in 1535 and leased out in 1542 to the Genoese Lomellini who dealt in the coral fished

there, was a similar haven.[54] The Spaniards knew exactly what the island was good for. In a report submitted to the Council of State in 1582, the Spanish ambassador in Genoa explained that "the only benefit of that place is the ransom of Christians, [since] the corsairs of Bizerte, Annaba, and all the coast of Barbary go there, and [we also receive] a few reports from the Levant."[55] The island's location, only 80 miles away from Tunis, 216 miles from Mazara del Vallo (located at the southwestern tip of Sicily), and 317 miles away from Algiers, was instrumental in its functioning as a trade zone but it also entailed shared sovereignty over its territory: Spanish and Genoese sovereignty embedded in the deed of leasing, and Ottoman sovereignty formed by the tribute Genoa paid Algiers and Tunis formalized in capitulations that the Sultan issued.[56] Jerónimo Gracián, held captive in Tunis in 1592 and 1594, portrayed the island as a safe exchange space that guaranteed the captives that they would not be sold back to slavery immediately upon paying the "go-between," while assuring the latter that he would be compensated upon releasing the captives he ransomed. In 1609, Fatima, an Algerian thirteen-years-old girl held captive in Livorno, was ransomed and sent back home. On the way, her ship stopped in Calvi in Corsica, where Fatima was forced to convert and baptized as Madalena. In response, the Algerian arrested three Trinitarian friars on a ransom mission and the hundred and thirty captives they had ransomed. In the negotiations that ensued, the Algerians insisted that Fatima be sent to Tabarka and questioned there by an Algerian envoy about the authenticity of her conversion– "if she was a Christian he would leave her, and if a Moor he would take her with him."[57] A few years later, the Algerians and Spaniards negotiated the ransom of the detained Trinitarians and their captives in return for the Bey of Alexandria and his wife, at the time held captive in the Spanish viceroyalty of Sicily. The parties struck an agreement that was never executed. According to the agreement the viceroy of Sicily had to transfer Mahamete Bey and his wife to the custody of the Genoese governor of Tabarka. In the meantime, the intermediary that cooked the deal had to arrange for a letter from the Sultan ordering the Pasha to release the Trinitarians and the captives they had ransomed. Once the Trinitarians and the captives were free, the governor of Tabraka was to free the Bey and his wife and provide them with safe passes.[58] Despite the failure of these cases, they point out how Muslims and Christians perceived Tabarka as a middle ground that facilitated exchange and safe interaction.

Manipulating the System

In the preceding pages I have reconstructed some of the unwritten rules of the ransom economy and the procedures required to negotiate, strike, and execute a transaction. These protocols were institutionalized to the degree that the parties involved had certain expectations, in some cases explicitly articulated in the documentation that recorded the exchange. When these expectations were not fulfilled, captives took action and tried to amend the situation by evoking these unwritten protocols and the potential destructive effects of their violations. Such instances not only shed light on the rules and the expectations themselves but also on the way various actors – the King, royal bureaucracies and bureaucrats but more interestingly captives themselves – could manipulate the ransom economy or object to such manipulations.

One set of expectations which captives, kin, and sellers had pertained to the exchange rate in which captives changed hands. The title of the paper, "para que me saque cabesa por cabesa [sic]", taken form the above mentioned letter of Diego López de Acosta suggests that the rate was a slave for slave but the records show that on the ground things were messier. From the distance of four or five centuries and on the basis of the scattered archival fragments we now possess it is hard to know the exact rate and the reasons it changed, and yet, it is fair to assume that all interested parties had a good sense of what it was.[59] Moreover, the ransom economy was such that when captives felt that their sovereigns authorized deals in rates too low or too high in a way that influenced the ransom market for the worse, they complained.[60] In 1589, for example, Spaniards held captive in Algiers sent a complaint to the crown regarding the king's approval of several ransom deals, which included the exchange of Christians enslaved in the Maghrib in return for Muslims enslaved in Spain. The captives did not challenge the idea of an exchange of Muslims for Christians, but they expressed fury over the rates of exchange on which the deals were based. In the complaint they sent to the Council of War, they argued that the crown freed rich Muslims in return for poor Christians, in other words, that the king paid too much and got too little:

> In Barbary, they have been making a profit by giving a poor Christian for a wealthy Moor from your Majesty's slaves [,] and even if it is true that one engages in good works when a captive leaves [captivity] in return for a Moor, one causes damage to the rest of the captives

> because following that the [Moors] raise the ransom [prices] saying that if such a poor Christian won them a Moor that was worth that much… and as a result ransoms cost a lot.[61]

The crown, the captives argued, inflated ransom rates and sabotaged their chances of returning home. The king's actions signaled to Muslim slave owners that they could and should ask for more in return for their Christian slaves. In response to the complaint, the king ordered a halt to such exchanges for the reasons listed in the captives' complaint.

I do not want to overestimate the success of their letter, for the crown's policy remained indecisive on this subject throughout the seventeenth century. While orders against such exchanges were regularly issued, captives' kin continued to petition the crown for his slaves, and royal officers continued to provide them with slaves to ransom back their relatives. Despite this continued back and forth, the complaint brought at least a temporary halt of ransom deals, demonstrating its potential and power to provoke action. The complaint reflects how the king's actions had an immediate effect on the ransom market in Algiers and thereby on slaves' lives. The beauty of this record, however, is that in contrast to other sources that were part of the procedure of the exchange itself, this one forms a commentary on the system and an attempt to affect it. It shows how beyond the common knowledge required to petition a sovereign for one of his slaves or find information about slaves across the sea, common knowledge shared by Algerian and Spanish widows and mothers, captives occasionally attempted to define the rates on which exchange was based and they could do that from their captivity away from home. In other words, captives and their kin not only employed the system but also participated in its shaping.

Another set of captives' expectations regarded the fair execution of ransom agreements. The following case is not about the barter of captives per-se but rather about a manumitted Muslim slave. Despite the slightly different context, it is worth examining in detail as it sheds more light on the ways in which ransom linked Spain, Morocco and Algiers and on how captives could manipulate the situation by making references to these links. It concerned Yusuf of Tlemecen, the slave of a Sevilian noble, who was manumitted but arrested soon afterward, enslaved again and forced to pull an oar on one of the royal galleys. His enslavement stands out as he was detained without having committed a crime, and in spite of carrying manumission records that vouched for his freedom and proved that he was on his way back to the Maghrib. Instead of falling

into desperation, Yusuf drafted a complaint and sent it to the Council of War on March 9, 1644. He explained that he was arrested immediately after his manumission on his way home and added that:

> In Barbary, they never detain Christians who paid their ransom; and by detaining in Spain the Moors who had paid their ransom, [the Spaniards] create a situation in which in Barbary they would do the same with the Christians, a thing that would result in notable damage to many Christians because there are much more Christians than Moors who are ransomed.[62]

This document is revealing. First, in contrast to Trinitarian and Mercedarian propagandistic images that portrayed Maghribi cities as lawless spaces in which capricious Muslims regularly violated agreements they themselves negotiated,[63] Yusuf's petition suggests that the execution of ransom agreements was fairer in the Maghrib than in Spain. His description, off course, might have been biased in the other direction. However, the fact that he was eventually released might suggest that the magistrates with whom he interacted believed him or at least acknowledged that there was some truth in his words. Second, the complaint shows how slaves were not entirely helpless, had access to paper and ink even while rowing on a slave galley and mastered and used, upon need, Spanish legal and administrative codes. Third, the petition did not merely express Yusuf's private anger and hope that the individual counselor, or more likely secretary, reading his petition would be kind enough to let him go. It echoed institutional norms and expectations that Yusuf knew his interlocutors shared with him. Yet, facing the violation of these norms, he added an implicit threat, reminding the Spanish magistrates how such incidents end – "that would result in notable damage to many Christians."[64] In so doing, he went beyond describing the system in which he was trapped, trying to affect it. Finally and perhaps more importantly, the success of the petition "Yusuf was released soon after" points out another way in which captivities of Muslims and of Christians were tightly connected: violation of ransom or manumission agreements struck with Muslims could result in reactive violation of agreements that Christians negotiated in the Maghrib. The threat Yusuf was giving was based on the asymmetry between Muslims and Christians' prospects of liberation. In making it, Yusuf showed how asymmetry could play in favor of Muslim slaves.

Conclusion

In his *Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, Braudel described piracy, and *ipso facto* captivity and ransom, as having "its own familiar customs, agreements and negotiation. While robbers and robbed were not actually accomplices before the event, like the popular figures of the *Commedia dell' Arte*, they were well used to methods of bargaining and reaching terms, hence the many networks of intermediaries."[65] The case that opened the article, like other cases examined, illustrates the complicity between captives and captors as well as that between kin of captives on both sides of the sea. The Council of War, in its response to the crown regarding the exchange of Babaçain for Álvarez claimed that the former was a ferocious corsair whose release would risk the life and freedom of Spaniards. Nonetheless, and in light of Álvarez' many years of service and of Babaçain's old age, the king consented to the petition Babaçain's wife submitted via Álvarez, manifesting his generosity towards his subjects. The successful ransom of both veterans shows how the absence of institutions such as the orders of redemption, the Trinitarians and the Mercedarians, did not prevent Ottoman Maghribis or Moroccans from ransoming their relatives. Together with Iberians, Maghribis developed procedures and unwritten protocols that facilitated the return home of their relatives enslaved in the Habsburg Empire. Independent ransom intermediaries, whose dynamism demonstrates that the ransom economy was never limited to ecclesiastic institution actors, transferred captives across the Mediterranean and handed them over to other go-betweens in trading zones that provided safe spaces for these barters. By focusing on these negotiations and exchanges rather than on captives' religious confession, Maghribis' involvement in the ransom economy becomes visible. When examined from this perspective, not only does it become clear that North African Muslims made huge efforts to liberate their beloveds but also that the captivity and ransom of Moroccans and Algerians and that of Christians from Iberia but also France and Italy were tightly entangled.

The fact that barter was the most common form of exchange of liberation of Muslims operates as a reminder that the Mediterranean ransom economy was not based exclusively on the selling of captives, but also on swapping, gift exchange, and a combination of these modalities. Profits from ransom and slave labor, then, lose their exclusivity as the only reasons for the capture and enslavement in the Mediterranean. Captivity and ransom in the Mediterranean was never only a business

and some bought slaves only in order to retrieve the liberty of their dear ones. Ironically, however, the execution of such barter agreements created a demand for more slaves. While the parties to such deals sought resolution to the violent effects of piratical practices, in so doing they perpetuated the same practices, since buying one slave in order to exchange him or her for a second required them to purchase a third to pay for the first. Such swapping geared towards separation, Christian slaves back to Christendom, Muslims back to Muslim territory, created endless links in the process. The article has pointed out three such instances: First, Algerians that interacted with Spaniards often involved royal authorities in such negotiations; second, the intervention of royal authority could immediately affect the ransom market across the sea by inflating exchange rates; third, violation of ransom deals of Muslims enslaved in Spain, often resulted in retaliation against Christians enslaved in the Maghrib. That these captivities formed elements of a single system did not entail their symmetry. First, because Christian captives enjoyed ransom services provided by the Trinitarians and the Mercedarians, services not available to Muslim captives. Second, Spanish royal politics regarding Muslim slaves and Spanish soldiers enslaved in the Maghrib furthered the prospects of ransom for Christians while diminishing them for Muslims. That happened because one hand the crown was reluctant to allow the ransom of certain classes of Muslim slaves. Third, asymmetry also dominated the production and archiving of information as well as its study in the present. The richness of Spanish archives allows the reconstruction of how Muslims and Christians negotiated and executed ransom agreements, but doubtlessly, further research in Ottoman Algerian and Moroccan archives would help recalibrate this history.

Captivity, as it emerges of the analysis, created a brutal rupture in the lives of individuals, but simultaneously, it helped make the Mediterranean into an economic, social and political space. Captivity forced Algerian and Moroccan mothers and wives to negotiate with Christian women in Europe the exchange of their sons and husbands; it allowed for the maintenance of kinship ties at home; it facilitated the entry of Maghribi Jews and Muslims into Spain, from which they were formally excluded since their expulsion; and thanks to paper and information flows, it permitted Spanish and Maghribi religious and political institutions to gain knowledge of what was happening in enemy territory. In that sense, the value of focusing on such exchanges goes

beyond the study of captivity and ransom as such, also shedding light on how the sea, a socio-political space linking Iberia and North Africa, emerged out of the flow of such transactions.

NOTES

[1] I thank Naor Ben Yehoyada, Jessica Marglin, Martin Hershenzon, Gillian Weiss and the anonymous reader of African Economic History for their comments on earlier version of the article.

[2] Archivo General de Simancas (here after AGS), Legajo 811, 5.16.1616 and Legajo 814, 4.9.1616.

[3] Alessandro Stella, *Histoires d'Esclaves dans la Péninsule Ibérique* (Paris: Éditions EHESS, 2000), 78-79; Raffaella Sarti, "Bolognesi schiavi dei 'turchi' e schiavi 'turchi' a Bologna tra cinque e settecento: alterità etnico-religiosa e riduzione in schiavitù," *Quaderni Storici*, 107 (2001): 450; Michel Fontenay, "Il mercato maltese degli schiavi al tempo dei Cavalieri di San Giobanni," *Quaderni Storici*, 107 (2001): 397; Robert Davis, "Counting European Slaves on the Barbary Coast," *Past and Present*, 172 (2001): 87-124. Salvatore Bono conjectured that between the sixteenth and nineteenth century 2,000,000 slaves from the Muslim Mediterranean entered Europe and around a 1,000,000 Christians were enslaved in the Muslim world. Salvatore Bono, "Slave Histories and Memoirs in the Mediterranean World: A Study of the Sources (Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries), in Maria Fusaro, Colin Heywood and Mohamed-Salah Omro eds., *Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean, Braudel's Maritime Legacy* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 105.

[4] For two notable exceptions see these attempts to compare Christian and Muslim captivity and slavery: Michel Fontenay, "L'esclave galérien dans la Méditerranée des Temps Modernes," in Henri Bresc ed., *Figures de l'esclave au Moyen-Age et dans le monde moderne: actes de la table ronde*, (Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 1996), 115-42, and Claude Larquié, "Captifs chrétiens et esclaves maghrébins au XVIIIe siècle: Une tentative de comparaison," in Gonçal López Nadal and María Luisa Sánchez León eds., *Captius i esclaus a l'antiguitat i al món modern. XIXe colloque du GIREA, Palma de Mallorca 1991* (Naples: Jovene Editore, 1996), 347-364.

[5] The literature on early modern captivity is vast and a few examples will suffice. On Spanish captives; see: Ellen G. Friedman, *Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983); Maximiliano Barrio Gozalo, *Esclavos y cautivos: Conflicto entre la cristiandad y el islam en el siglo XVIII* (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León. Consejería de Cultura y Turísmo, 2006); José Antonio Martínez Torres, *Prisioneros de los infieles: vida y rescate de los cautivos cristianos en el Mediterráneo musulmán (siglos XVI-XVII)* (Barcelona: Ediciones Bellaterra, 2004). On English; see: Nabil I. Matar, *Britain and Barbary, 1589-1689*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005) and Matar, "English Accounts of Captivity in North Africa and the Middle East: 1577-1625," *Renaissance Quarterly*, 54 (2001): 553-572; Linda Colley, *Captives, Britain, Empire and the World, 1600-1850*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002). On Algerians; see: Moulay Belhamissi, *Les captifs algériens et l'Europe chrétienne* (*1518-1830*), (Alger: L'Entreprise Nationale du Livre, 1988). More broadly, on North African captives, see: Matar, "Piracy and Captivity in the

Early Modern Mediterranean: The Perspective from Barbary," in Claire Jowett ed., *Pirates? The Politics of Plunder, 1550-1650* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 56-73. On French, Gillian Lee Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs, France and Slavery in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

[6] Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs* and Belhamissi, *Les captifs algériens.*

[7] AGS, *Estado*, Legajo 246, 5.12.1612.

[8] AGS, *Estado*, Legajo, 992, 10.30.1629.

[9] AGS, *Estado*, Legajo 3446, 3.21.1633.

[10] For documents and more about this case, see: Vernet, J., "La embajada de al-Ghassni (1690-1691)," *Al-Andalus*, 18 (1953): 109-131; Tomás García Figueras, Carlos Rodríguez Joulia Saint-Cy, *Larache: datos para su historia en el siglo XVII*, (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Africanos. CSIC, 1972), 319-327; Arribas Palau, Mariano, "De nuevo sobre la embajada de al-Gassani (1690-1691)," *Al-Qantara*, 6 (1985): 199-289; Ubaldo de Casanova y Todolí, "Algunas anotaciones sobre el comportamiento de los esclavos moros en Mallorca durante el siglo XVII y un ejemplo de intercambio con cautivos cristianos," *Bolletí de la Societat Arqueològica Lul·liana: Revista d'estudis històrics*, 41 (1985): 323-332.

[11] For documents and study of the ransom of Moroccans and Algerians in the second half of the eighteenth century orchestrated by the Sultan Muḥammad b.ʿAbdallāh al-Khaṭīb, see: Ramón Lourido Díaz, "La obra redentora del sultán marroquí Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh entre los cautivos musulmanes en Europa (siglo XVIII)," *Cuadernos de Historia del Islam*, 11 (1984): 138-183 and Mariano Arribas Palau, "Argelinos cautivos en España, rescatados por el sultán de Marruecos," *Boletín de la Asociación Española de Orientalistas*, 26 (1990): 23-54.

[12]Wolfgang Kaiser, "La excepción permanente. Actores, visibilidad y asimetrías en los intercambios comerciales entre los países europeos y el Magreb (siglos XVI-XVII)," in José Antonio Martínez Torres ed., *Circulación de personas e intercambios en el Mediterráneo y en el Atlántico (siglos XVI, XVII, XVIII)* (Madrid: CSIC, 2008), 171-189. Daniel Hershenzon, "Plaintes et menaces réciproques: captivité et violence religieuses dans la Méditerranée du XVIIe siècle," in Jocelyne Dakhlia and Wolfgang Kaiser eds., *Les Musulmans dans l'histoire de l'Europe. Tome 2. Passages et contacts en Méditerranée* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2013), 441-460.

[13] On Trinitarians and Mercedarians, see: Friedman, *Spanish Captives*; Barrio Gozalo, *Esclavos y cautivos*; Martínez Torres, *Prisioneros de los infieles.* On Italian confraternities, see: Davis, *Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500-1800* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 139-193.

[14] On the state of seventeenth and eighteenth century Algerian archives and sources relevant for this history, see: Loualich, Fatiha, "In the Regency of Algiers: The human Side of the Algerine Corso," in Maria Fusaro, Colin Heywood and Mohamed-Salah Omro eds., *Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean, Braudel's Maritime Legacy* (New York: I. B. Tauris: 2010), 69-96, esp. 93-96. On the problem of Moroccan documents from the early modern period, see the comments in Mercedes García Arenal, *Ahmad al-Mansur, The Beginning of Modern Morocco*(Oxford: One World, 2009), 144 and

in Daniel J. Schroeter, *The Sultan's Jew, Morocco and the Sephardi World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), xiii.

[15] During most of the period examined here, the Spanish Empire included Portugal, Sicily, Naples, Milan and several fort towns in Mediterranean and Atlantic North Africa.

[16] "…[E]n San Lucar… en la calle de los Bretones, y se llama su amo Nicolás Rubin…" Archivo Histórico Nacional (hereafter AHN), *Inquisición*, Leg. 933/2, 11.13.1655. While the letter of the Muslim slave did not survive, the letters that the Christian captive with whom the Muslim slave was supposed to be exchanged did survive. In his letters, the Christian captive referred to the information the Muslim provided his Algerian relatives with. The title of this article, "para que me saque cabesa por cabesa [sic]," is taken from the letter of the Christian captive.

[17] "… después haver servido a vuestra majestad muchos años en la harmada rreal… y el año de 611 fue captivo de los turcos de Argel…," AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Legajo. 811, 16.5.1611.

[18] "…no tiene con que se poder rrescatar y la dicha mora, su ama, está determinada de no le dar por quanto tesoro hubiere en el mundo menos de por el rrescate de su marido…" AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Legajo. 811, 16.5.1611.

[19] For example: AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Legajo. 784, 31.3.1613. On the role of slaves in the royal galleys and the crown's position on their employment, see: Manuel Lomas Cortés, "Les galériens du Roi Catholique: esclaves, forçats et rameurs salariés dans les escadres de Philippe III (1598-1621)," *Cahiers des Annales de Normandie*, 36 (2011): 111-124, esp. 9-13.

[20] AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Libro 159, 1630.

[21] AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Legajo. 213, Fol. 546. "y no es arraez ny de consideración."

[22] AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Legajo. 810, 24.9.1616, "que no es arraez ni de rescate."

[23] AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Legajo. 442, 23.4.1594, "pedirá al rrey le dé de limosna el otro cristiano porque le dan su hijo."

[24] AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Legajo. 442, 23.4.1594 "que atento a esto le aga merced del otro moro para hazer el truque y rescate de su hijo."

[25] AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Legajo. 442, 23.4.1594, "Hamete de Marruecos, hijo de Ali, de hedad de 22 años pestañas y cejas grandes con un lunar grande en la garganta y una señal de fuego en el brazo derecho y unas sajaduras en la frente pequeño del cuerpo fue cautibo en la Almería de Ceuta… en siete de otubre de mil y quinientos y ochenta y tres años… Y por lo que parece por este assiento y somos informados no parece que sea de consideración ni arráez ni de rrescate."

[26] AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Legajo. 274, fol. 116, 9.20.1589 "Y el capitán que le captivo por llevar mayor ynteres sea el ya otro los dio por arraez,"

[27] AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Legajo. 274, fol. 116, 9.20.1589 "buscando siempre excusas y doliéndose poco de los captivos cristianos,"

[28] AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Leg. 272, fol. 56 "…[Y] que aunque a acudido y rrequerido con las dichas dos cedulas al adelantado no le a querido dar el dicho turco,"

[29] Atlantic slavery, he has added, was "above all a matter of business," slavery in the Maghrib of "passion… almost of *jihad*." Davis, *Christian slaves, Muslim Masters*, xxv.

With a small variation, Davis has reproduced a long-criticized dichotomy in studies of slavery according to which slavery in America was economic, while in Africa it was social. On the dichotomy between the alleged economic nature of slavery in the Atlantic and the social nature of slavery in Africa, see: Frederic Cooper, "The Problem of Slavery in African Studies," *Journal of African History* 20 (1979): 103-125.

[30] Michel, Fontenay, "Esclaves et/ou captifs : préciser les concepts," in Wolfgang Kaiser ed., *Le commerce des captifs : les intermédiaires dans l'échange et le rachat des prisonniers en Méditerranée, XVe-XVIIIe siècle* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2008), 15-24.

[31] Bono, "Slave Histories and Memoirs in the Mediterranean World," 100. On the distinction in Roman, Christian and Judeo traditions, see: Andrés Díaz Borrás, *El miedo al Mediterráneo: La caridad popular valenciana y la redención de cautivos bajo poder musulmán 1323-1539* (Barcelona: CSIC. Instituto Milá Fontanals, 2001), 5-18. On the terms used in Arabic, see: Nabil Matar, *Britain and Barbary, 1589-1689*, 114-115. On the terms in Ottoman Turkish see: Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, "Introduction," in Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor eds., *Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders (Early Fifteenth-Early Eighteenth Centuries)* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), xiv. The latter offer an alternative solution of this debate with the "Ransom Slavery," Ibid. European understandings of the bondage of Christians in the Mediterranean were reshaped at the turn of the nineteenth century by the phenomenon of slavery of Blacks. Whereas in the early modern period the captivity of Christians in the Maghrib was perceived in religious or commercial terms, in the nineteenth century, it came to be understood in racial terms. It was no more the captivity of Christians but rather the slavery of whites. For a discussion of this shift, see: Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs* and Ann Thompson, *Barbary and Enlightenment: European Attitudes Towards the Maghreb in the eighteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1987),

[32] Matar, "Piracy and Captivity in the Early Modern Mediterranean."

[33] Miriam Hoexter, *Endowments, Rulers and Community, Waqf al Haramayn in Ottoman Algiers*, (Leiden: Brill 1998), 27 and 158.

[34] PS Van Koningsveld, "Muslim slaves and captives in Western Europe during the late Middle Ages, *Islam and Christian-Muslim relations*, 6 (1995): 10.

[35] AHN, *Inqisición*, Leg. 1824-2.

[36] AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Legajo. 271, fol. 304, 1589.

[37] AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Legajo. 448, fol. 206, 23.10.1595.

[38] Míkel de Epalza, "Moriscos y Andalusíes en Túnez durante el siglo XVII," *Al-Andalus*, 34:2 (1969): 247-327, esp. 262-269.

[39] Peter A. Mazur, "Combating 'Mohammedan Indecency': The Baptism of Muslim Slaves in Spanish Naples, 1563-1667," *Journal of Early Modern History*, 13 (2009): 25-48, esp. 32-33.

[40] Martín Corrales Eloy, *Comercio de Cataluña con el Mediterráneo musulmán (siglos XVI-XVIII): El Comercio con los 'enemigos de la fe'* (Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2001) and Roberto Blanes Andrés, *Valencia y El Magreb*: *Las Relaciones Comerciales Maritimas (1600-1703)* (Barcelona: Bellaterra, 2010).

[41] On the "permanent exception," see: Kaiser, "La excepción permanente," pp. 171-189. For a brilliant analysis of the negotiations between the Majorcan administration and the Spanish crown regarding the right to trade with Muslims, see: Natividad Planas, "La frontière franchissable: normes et pratiques dans les échanges entre le royaume de Majorque et les terres d'Islam au XVIIe siècle," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 48-2 (2001): 123-147.

[42] The Inquisition based its right to interfere on matters of commerce with Muslims on a papal bull prohibiting it. But Già's attorney claimed the bishop annulled the bull and hence it was in the Episcopal rather than inquisitorial jurisdiction. We do not know what was the bishop's response, but the claim of the attorney points to how interactions with Maghribi fell under a multiplicity of competing jurisdictions, a situation which the parties involved could employ to their favor, see: Natividad Planas, "Conflicts de competence aux frontiers. Le contrôle de la circulation des homes et des marchandises dans le royaume de Majorque au XVIIe siècle," *Cromohs*, 8 (2003) : 1-14.

[43] AHN, *Inquisición*, Legajo 1714, carpeta 7.

[44] Wolfgang Kaiser, "Zones de transit. Lieux, temps, modalités du rachat de captifs en Méditerranée,", in Jocelyne Dakhlia and Wolfgang Kaiser eds., *Les Musulmans dans l'histoire de l'Europe. Tome 2. Passages et contacts en Méditerranée* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2013), 251-272.

[45] Jean-Frédéric Schaub, *Les juifs du roi d'Espagne* (Paris: Hachette Littératures, 1999).

[46] Beatriz Alonso Acero, *Orán-Mazalquivir, 1589-1639: una sociedad española en la frontera de Berbería* (Madrid: CSIC, 2000).

[47] Schaub, *Les juifs du roi d'Espagne*, 94-5.

[48] AGS, *Estado*, Legajo, 992, 10.30.1629.

[49] On the role of credit in ransom operations in the context of Tunis, see: Sadok Boubaker, "Réseaux et techniques de rachat des captifs de la course à Tunis au XVIII[e] siècle," in Kaiser ed., *Le commerce des captifs*, 25-46.

[50] Emanuel de Aranda, *Les captifs d'Alger: Relation de la captivité du sieur Emanuel d'Aranda* Ed. Latifa Z'rari Latifa (Paris: J. P. Rocher, 1997), 65-74.

[51] Diego Díaz Hierro, *Historia de la Merced de Huelva: hoy catedral de su diócesis* (Huelva, 1975), 36.

[52] "…[M]andarle a Seuta con buena custodia, y hacerle escribir que baje yo a Tetuán para que allí se aga como es costumbre el trueque…" AHN, *Inquisición*, Legajo 933/2, 11.13.1655.

[53] AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Legajo 432, fol 181, 10.22.1595.

[54] For example, the lease from 1615, see: AGS, *Estado*, Negociaciones de Sicilia, Legajo 1169, fols. 18-20.

[55] …[C]omodidad solo ay en aquel lugar de rescatar cristianos acudiendo allí los corsarios de Viserta, Bona, y toda la costa de Berbería, y algunos avisos de Levante… AGS, *Estado*, Legajo 1416, fol. 138/1-2.

[56] Philippe Gourdin, *Tabarka: histoire et archéologie d'un préside espagnol et d'un comptoir génois en terre africaine (XVe-XVIIIe siècle)* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2008), 245-269.

[57] "Si fuere christiana la dexa y si mora la lleve consigo," AGS, *Estado*, Legajo 1882, fol. 245, 8.1.1617.

[58] AGS, *Estado*, Legajo 259, 20.11.1614.

[59] For economists' attempt to calculate and analyze ransom prices over the long term, see: Attila Ambrus and Eric Chaney, "Pirates of the Mediterranean: An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining with Transaction Costs, 9.14.2010," http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/chaney/files/barbary.pdf, accessed on July 10th 2011. See also: Jean Mathiex, "Trafic et Prix de l'Homme en Méditerranée aux XVII° et XVIII° siècles," *Annales. E.S.C.* 9 (1954): 157-64.

[60] On the Mediterranean ransom economy, see: Wolfgang Kaiser, "L'économie de la rançon en Méditerranée occidentale (XVIe-XVIIe siècle), in Simonetta Cavaciocchi ed.,, *Ricchezza dal mare, secc. XIII-XVIII*, vol. 2 (Florence: Le Monnier, 2006), 689-701 and the articles in Wolfgang Kaiser, Ed. *Le commerce des captifs: les intermédiaires dans l'échange et le rachat des prisonniers en Méditerranée, XVe-XVIIIe siècle* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2008).

[61] AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Legajo 268, Fol. 200, 1.3.1589. "…[Y] aunque es verdad que se haze buena obra al cautibo que sale por el moro, hazese mala a todos los cautivos porque con esto les suben los rescates diziendo que tal christiano pobre le dio un moro que valían tanto y quieren al respecto que cada uno vaya subiendo y con esto cuestan muchos los rescates…"

[62] AGS, *Guerra Antigua*, Legajo 1541, 3.9.1644. "Pues en la Ververía a ningún christiano se le detiene después de haver pagado su rescate, y deteniendo en España a los moros después de haverse serrescatado será dar ocación a que en la Ververía hagan otro tanto con los christianos de que resultara notable perjuicio a muchos cristianos pues ellos son muchos los que por su rescate salen del cautiverio y muy pocos los moros."

[63] For example, see the collection of early modern pamphlets related to Algiers: Ignacio Bauer Landauer, *Papeles de mi archive: Relaciones de África (Argel)*, Vol. 4 (Madrid: Editorial Ibero-Africano-Americana, 1922/3).

[64] On the dynamic of challenge and riposte within the context of captivity across the Mediterranean, see Hershenzon, "Plaintes et menaces réciproques: captivité et violence religieuses dans la Méditerranée du XVIIe siècle."

[65] Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. Vol. 2 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 867.